DOD - Ans.



Approved for Release 2000/08/21: CIA-RDP33-02415A000400270046-7

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCT 2 0 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Agency Cold War Contingency Air Requirements SUBJECT:

Continuing the study of cold war contingency air requirements which has been underway for several years, another meeting was convened in this office on 11 October 1960. The first order of business was to establish whether or not the objective of this long range project was to provide for a standby capability in being such as a small tailor-made force including selected aircraft modified to Agency specifications with spares and trained personnel. Agency representatives stated that, although it would be wise to stockpile certain items related to the use of aircraft such as guns, ammunition, and bombs, they felt it would not be possible for the CIA to maintain a contingency force in being.

The second order of business concerned "lead time required by DOD to meet Agency air needs" as referenced in your memorandum, same subject, dated 19 September 1960. This question is directly related to the first, and since maintenance of stand-by aircraft on a ready basis was not acceptable, the importance of an early submission of a statement of requirement by the Agency for any operation requiring aircraft support becomes a matter of priority. This type of support can be rendered by DOD under current operating procedures provided the requirement from the Agency includes such information as a) type of use (fighter, transport, bomber, etc.), b) air base facility available (length, surface, hangars, etc.), c) range and combat radius date, d) deniability criteria, e) quantity contemplated, f) etc.

At this point Defense representatives pointed out that any consideration of "lead-time" must necessarily include other pertinent factors. For example, it has always been easier and much quicker for Defense to furnish aircraft than it has been for the Agency to develop a crew capability (instructors and operational crews), base facilities, logistics means, etc. Therefore, it was suggested that if lead time is to be effectively reduced the reductions should come along these lines.

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Another factor affecting lead time concerns aircraft modification. We have learned through experience that most Agency requirements for aircraft require special modification of current inventory configuration in order to meet operational requirements or deniability criteria. Anything done beforehand by the Agency to provide advanced or early modification specifications will cut lead time.

The question of "the economies of maintaining a continuous capability" was only briefly discussed since it had already been determined that this was no longer under consideration.

The next item "means of periodically improving the quality of Agency air capabilities" was also only briefly discussed since the lack of "on-hand" aircraft (other than present types - C-54, C-118, B-26, etc.) leaves little area for action. However the DOD does have the capability to assist the Agency at any time with its air capability and will provide this assistance upon receipt of a requirement.

The next subject concerning "use of military personnel in deniable warfare operations" was only briefly mentioned. This is a most sensitive and complex subject which might better be made the subject of a separate personnel study. It does appear that, whenever there is time to plan ahead for an operation, other means might be recommended and exploited whereas the use of military personnel for such eventualities should always be avoided except in emergency situations. Here a distinction should be made between the use of military personnel for planning, training, and logistics support, which in most instances are acceptable activities, and operational use which would only in rare instances be acceptable.

The matter of "Agency reimbursement to DOD for equipment and services" was not discussed since current procedures and practice have standardized this area of administration.

With reference to para 3, 4, 5 of your 19 September 1960 memo, DOD will continue to support Agency aircraft requirements to the extent possible, limited only by the compelling requirements of the primary defense mission. In instances where aircraft are to be utilized on a temporary basis without modification current practice such as that now in effect in support of project RIM FIRE would permit return to DOD inventory.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 have been mentioned above.

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With reference to paragraph 8, the decision on the part of the Agency not to maintain an on-hand capability removed much of the urgency of this statement. On the other hand, Agency planning factors and estimated requirements will always receive prompt action by this office and the supporting offices of the services.

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